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THE TROUBLE WITH FARMOUTS: THE PROBLEM OF
THE INNOCENT, NONPERFORMING FARMEE
Benjamin Idzik+
The oil market is a volatile universe. The price of the commodity has a
profound impact both on the national and global economies and on the lives of
everyday consumers. Consider the high prices of 2022 compared with the record
lows seen in 2020, the price of oil affects almost everything. The United States
is one of the top oil producing nations in the world. The size and importance of
the industry has led to a somewhat unique area of the legal practice known as oil
and gas law. Among its many tenants is an instrument known as a farmout
contract. Farmout contracts have steadily grow in use by the industry since their
inception, supplementing and even replacing the oil and gas lease, which
traditionally has been the primary legal mechanism under which oil drilling
takes place.
Oil and gas leases generally obligate lessees to drill continually or else face
breach liability. In response, many courts eased this requirement of strict
performance by way of novel and established legal doctrines when the lessee’s
nonperformance was caused by circumstances outside of its control. However,
even though, farmees—the parties that are obligated to drill under farmout
contracts—are generally subject to the same drilling requirements, they do not
enjoy the same judicial protections as oil and gas lessees. No current legal
doctrine can readily excuse their nonperformance, no matter how blameless the
farmee may be. This is the problem of the innocent, nonperformance farmee.
The following comment examines the problem’s relevant background, analyzes
the shortcomings in the current law, and suggests two solutions for future parties
and courts to consider.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Developments in science and technology have greatly diversified the energy
industry.1 Yet, among all the current ways to produce energy, oil remains king.2
The commodity’s beginnings are well-known; oil is a fossil fuel that is formed
when dead and decaying plankton and algae are trapped underground in certain
conditions for millions of years.3 These pools remain untouched until producers
discover and, by various means, extract the oil within them.4 The oil that is
extracted is raw, hence the name “crude oil.”5 To be commercially viable, crude
oil must be refined into different petroleum products: diesel and heating oil,
hydrocarbon gas liquids (such as propane), jet fuel, and the most common being
1. The Diversity of Our Energy Market, SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FUND BLOG (June 17,
2020), https://www.thesef.org/diversity-of-energy-market/.
2. See Oil and Petroleum Products Explained: Use of Oil, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/use-of-oil.php (May 10, 2021).
3. See Oil and Petroleum Products Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/ (Apr. 19, 2022).
4. See id.
5. See id.
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motor gasoline.6 All of these products are used in some way by virtually every
individual and industry within every economy.7 In the United States, petroleum
fuel consumption makes up the largest share of the total of the country’s energy
usage.8
Prior to the economic disruption caused by COVID-19, the demand for oil
was relatively stable since 2006.9 Its supply, on the other hand, grew steadily
since 2011 and experienced a significant increase by 2018.10 This surge was
prompted by the vast expansion of oil production in the United States and was
later amplified by the response of foreign competitors.11 When American oil
production hit record levels by 2019, the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) responded by flooding the market with oil at
“record levels” to push emerging United States producers into bankruptcy.12 By
2020—a year that impacted far more than the oil market13—oil supply was even
further inflated by a Russian and Saudi Arabian price war,14 and perhaps more
obviously, by the effects of COVID-19. In response to the coronavirus’s rapid
spread, travel restrictions and quarantine measures imposed by governments
across the world caused global oil demand to plummet.15 By the late spring,
these factors led to a historic oversaturation of the oil market.16 Although the
6. See id.
7. See generally Use of Energy Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/use-of-energy/ (June 13, 2022).
8. See id.
9. See N. Sönnichsen, Daily Global Crude Oil Demand 2006-2026, Published under Daily
Demand for Crude Oil Worldwide From 2006 to 2020, with a Forecast until 2026*, STATISTA (Jun.
13, 2022), https://www.statista.com/statistics/271823/daily-global-crude-oil-demand-since-2006/
(providing also on this website a chart demonstrating the demand’s stability until 2020).
10. See Oil and Petroleum Products Explained: Where Our Oil Comes From, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (June 1, 2022), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/
where-our-oil-comes-from.php (charting the production of the top five crude oil producing
countries from 1980 to 2021).
11. Id.; Alex Ritchie, A Reexamination and Reformation of the Habendum Clause Paying
Quantities Standard Under Oil and Gas Leases, 3 OIL & GAS, NAT. RES., & ENERGY J. 977, 978–
79 (2017).
12. U.S. Field Oil Production of Crude Oil, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 7, 2022), https:
//www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPUS2&f=A; Ritchie, supra note
11, at 978–79.
13. See generally Reis Thebault, Tim Meko & Junne Alcantara, A Pandemic Year: Sorrow
and Stamina, Defiance and Despair. It’s Been a Year., WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2021/coronavirus-timeline/.
14. Natasha Turak, The Saudi-Russia Oil Price War Was a ‘Very Big Mistake,’ Qatar Energy
Minister Says, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/09/saudi-russia-oil-price-war-was-verybig-mistake-qatar-energy-minister.html (June 9, 2020, 9:25 AM).
15. Jeff Desjardin, How Oil Prices Went Subzero: Explaining the COVID-19 Oil Crash,
VISUALCAPITALIST (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/subzero-oil-price-crashcovid-19/.
16. Crude Oil Prices-70 Year Historical Chart, MACROTRENDS, https://www.macrotrends.
net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart (last visited Apr. 6, 2022); Stanley Reed & Clifford Krauss,
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oversaturation allowed consumers to enjoy low prices at the pump,17 it also
wreaked havoc on the national oil market, the health and stability of which is
essential to the United States’ economy and national security.18
In countries like Saudi Arabia and Russia, where the oil industry is effectively
state-owned, production cuts can be easily coordinated by the national
government.19 In the United States, however, the federal government largely
lacks such centralized control to compel large-scale production furloughs.
While it enjoys regulatory control over oil production on federal land, most
American oil is produced on state land and is subject to state regulation.20 This
means that any significant scale backs of production would have to be directed
by the legislatures and executive agencies of oil-producing states.21 However,
political realities and the independence of the states on these matters make any
state led furloughs unlikely.22 While an analysis of this issue is beyond the scope
of this comment, the limitations of the federal government and the states in this
regard must be noted.
Oil production in the United States has generally occurred by way of leases.23
These legal creations facilitate the input of oil into the market, and, as such, are
of incredible importance. While oil and gas leases have historically been the
dominant legal instruments used by the industry,24 since the 1980s, farmout
Too Much Oil: How a Barrel Came to Be Worth Less Than Nothing, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/20/business/oil-prices.html (Sept. 28, 2021).
17. Id.
18. See generally US Oil Needs More Explicit Support from Policymakers: Standard
Chartered, CNBC (Apr. 24, 2020, 1:24 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2020/04/24/us-oilneeds-more-explicit-support-from-policymakers-standard-chartered.html; Charles L. Glaser, How
Oil Influences U.S. National Security, 38 INT’L. SECS. J. 112, 112–13 (2013).
19. See generally Jim Krane, Energy Governance in Saudi Arabia: An Assessment of the
Kingdom’s Resources, Policies, and Climate Approach, CTR. FOR ENERGY STUD. (Jan. 2019),
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/research-document/09666564/ces-pub-saudienergy011819.pdf; Jennifer Josefson & Alexandra Rotar, Oil and Gas Regulation in the Russian
Federation: Overview, THOMSON REUTERS: PRACTICAL LAW, https://uk.practicallaw
.thomsonreuters.com/0-527-3028 (law stated as at Apr. 1, 2021) (providing “[a] Q&A guide to oil
and gas regulation in the Russian Federation”).
20. E. Allison & B. Mandler, U.S Regulation of Oil and Gas Operations, AM. GEOSCIENCES
INST. 1 (2018), https://www.americangeosciences.org/sites/default/files/AGI_PE_Regulations_
web_final.pdf; Alexandra B. Klass, Federalism “Collisions” in Energy Policy, REG. REV. (Nov.
19, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/11/19/klass-federalism-collisions-energy-policy/.
21. Allison & Mandler, supra note 20, at 1.
22. Klass, supra note 20.
23. David E Pierce, Rethinking the Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 445, 445 (1987).
24. Id. at 447–48 (“The four basic oil and gas lease clauses which usually comprise oil and
gas leases are the granting clause, habendum clause, drilling/delay rental clause, and royalty clause.
The other clauses encountered in lease forms are generally designed to alter in some fashion the
four basic clauses. The granting clause states the substances, land, and associated surface rights
which are being transferred to the developer. It also specifies the purpose of the transfer—to
explore, develop, and produce the granted substances. The habendum clause states the duration of
the granted rights. The grant will terminate after a stated period following the grant unless the
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contracts have become “nearly as important and commonplace”25 A farmout is
a contract whereby “one who owns drilling rights [(usually the lessee of an oil
and gas lease)] assign[s] all or a portion of those rights to another in exchange
for drilling and testing” or other consideration.26 Like in any other contract, each
party to a farmout contract is required to perform its end of the bargain generally
regardless of whether it is made more diffcult by any external circumstances.
This notion of strict performance characterizes the traditional law of contracts.
Under it, courts focus on effectuating the intent of the parties at the time of
contracting, and rarely excuse a party’s nonperformance.27 But when
performance consists of oil production, common sense suggests that the stake of
the contract is much higher than when the bargain is for widgets or the like.
This comment considers whether courts should apply the traditional law of
contracts, with its insistence on performance and narrow excuse doctrines, to
farmout contracts. The answer is no. This argument is not founded solely on
pragmatism aimed at decreasing production and supply when economically
necessary. Rather, it is rooted in the tradition of oil and gas law under which
courts have consistently declined to apply established legal principles to oil and
gas transactions when doing so would defy fairness or public policy.28 Indeed,
modern oil and gas law is built on exceptions to longstanding property and
contract law principles.29 And though the oil industry is cyclical in nature, as
price spikes and downturns have and will continue to happen, the severity of the
2020 oversupply crisis is useful to illustrate the weak points within the current
law and address them in anticipation of future downturns.
To animate the discussion that will follow, this hypothetical illustrates the
problem of what will be called “the innocent, nonperforming farmee”:
Joe owns Blackacre, a 160-acre plot of land in rural Kansas. He was
approached by Big Barrel, a regional oil business, and allowed it to conduct
mineral testing on the property. After testing, the company discovered that the
ground below Blackacre contains a massive oil pool. As a result, Big Barrel
asked Joe to lease to it the mineral estate of the property. Joe agreed, and the
two parties entered into a standard oil and gas lease; its habendum clause
provides that the lease will continue in duration “for ten years, and as long
thereafter as oil and gas are being produced.” The two parties executed the lease
and Big Barrel promptly began drilling operations. Operations ran smoothy and
the company enjoyed a healthy flow of oil from the property. Additionally, Joe
developer’s efforts result in production of a granted substance, in which case the grant will continue
so long as the developer’s production income exceeds expenses.”).
25. John S. Lowe, Analyzing Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements, 2 OIL & GAS, NAT. RES., &
ENERGY J. 263, 268 (2017).
26. Id.
27. 11 Williston on Contracts § 32:2 (4th ed.).
28. See infra Part IV, Section A.
29. See generally James W. Coleman, The Third Age of Oil and Gas Law, 95 IND. L.J. 389,
391 (2020).
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benefited handsomely from resultant royalties. However, Big Barrel could only
afford to drill on 80 of the 160 acres of the property. Seeking to maximize its
profit from the lease, Big Barrel entered into negotiations with Little Pump, a
local oil operator, to farmout the remaining 80 unused acres of Blackacre to it.
Little Pump was anxious to take advantage of a high price environment for oil
and saw a farmout contract as a low-risk, high-reward opportunity. After some
negotiations, the two companies struck a deal. Little Pump agreed to construct
a well and begin production within two years as a condition to receive the 80acre assignment.
After signing the farmout, supply levels rose and decreased the commodity’s
market price. This prompted Little Pump to hold off on construction with the
expectation that the market would balance out and the price rebound. However,
its hesitation did not pay off as supply levels continued to rise. Adding to Little
Pump’s troubles, the COVID-19 Pandemic engulfed the country, prompting
authorities to issue quarantine orders and place restrictions on people and
businesses, thereby further decimating oil’s price. With the two-year deadline
quickly approaching, Big Barrel, the farmor, and Joe, the lessor, are demanding
that Little Pump proceed with production as planned.
This situation places Little Pump in a precarious position through no fault of
its own, one that goes beyond simple inconvenience or even the regular hazards
of the oil industry. On a microlevel, it forces Little Pump to decide between two
difficult, and seemingly unfair, choices: The company can elect to perform as
planned but then be stuck with oil for which there is no meaningful demand,
requiring it to either to sell the oil at an undesirable rate (assuming it could find
a buyer), or shoulder the significant cost of storing it.30 Alternatively, Little
Pump can refuse to perform as expected but, by not doing so, loose the entire
farmout.
On a macrolevel, if Little Pump were to perform as planned, it would be
infusing oil into an already oversaturated market, leading to waste and further
undermining the stability of the national oil market. The market depends on a
healthy balance of supply and demand. When supply is either under or
oversaturated, history is filled with examples of the disastrous results that such
environments produce.31 The ultimate fear in this context is that oversaturation
can lead to the weakening or collapse of the domestic oil industry, which in turn,
would harm the country’s economy and national security.
This comment has four parts and three significant subsections. Part I explores
the relevant provisions of oil and gas law surrounding farmout contracts. Part II
analyzes the established means of excusing nonperformance in the context of oil
and gas transactions and details how they are inadequate to address the problem
30. Daniel Tenreiro, Why Oil Prices Went Negative, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/04/why-oil-prices-went-negative/ (noting how in 2020
“storing oil [was] more [expensive] than the oil itself”).
31. See generally Tyler Priest, The Dilemmas of Oil Empire, 99 J. AM. HIST. 236 (2012).
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of the innocent, nonperforming farmee. Part III (A) discusses how and why
courts historically have declined to apply established legal doctrines to oil and
gas transactions when doing so would defy fairness or public policy. Part III (B)
examines how the problem of the innocent, nonperforming farmee defies both
and argues that, to address it, courts must modify the temporary cessation of
production doctrine. Alternatively, Part III (C) proposes that the problem may
also be resolved by an unconventional application of either the doctrines of
impracticability or frustration of purpose. Part IV concludes by arguing that the
modification of the temporary cessation of production doctrine is the most
attainable and effective solution to the problem of the innocent, nonperforming
farmee.
II. OIL & GAS LAW AND FARMOUTS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
A. Oil & Gas Transactions Generally
As mentioned previously, oil and gas production in the United States has
occurred largely under the legal framework of leases.32 In most jurisdictions, an
oil and gas lease is not treated like a traditional lease seen in the landlord-tenant
settings; rather, “[i]t is more properly characterized as a deed or conveyance.” 33
Some of these jurisdictions find that the lease simply conveys to the lessee an
“exclusive right to profit” from minerals that it extracts—known as a “profit à
prendre.”34 Others view it as granting the lessee “a fee simple . . . in the minerals
themselves.”35 But regardless of how state jurisprudence characterizes the
interest that the oil and gas lease conveys, perhaps its most defining quality is
its habendum clause. The habendum clause specifies what the conveyance
grants the lessee. In a typical oil and gas lease, the habendum clause grants the
lessee an interest in oil and gas for a period of time and specifies that after that
period, the interest remains with the lessee only if production of oil and gas is
in-fact taking place.36 It is worded something like the following: “from A to B
for ten years, and as long thereafter as oil is being produced.”37 For analysis
purposes, consider the conveyance to be divided into two terms. The primary
term conveys the interest to the lessee for a fixed period—in this case ten years.38
The secondary term provides that the conveyance will remain with the lessee as

32. Pierce, supra note 23, at 445.
33. Ritchie, supra note 11, at 981.
34. T. Ray Guy & Jason E. Wright, The Enforceability of Consent-to-Assign Provisions in
Texas Oil and Gas Leases, 71 SMU L. REV. 477, 481 (2018).
35. Id. at 481–82.
36. Ritchie, supra note 11, at 981.
37. Lynette S. Wilson, Comment, The Temporary Cessation of Production Doctrine:
Litigating Cessation of Production and Termination of Oil and Gas Leases . . . What the Heck Does
“Or the Like” Mean Anyway?, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 311, 317 (2004).
38. Ritchie, supra note 11, at 981.
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long as it is producing oil.39 Most jurisdictions allow the lessee to transfer its
interest in an oil and gas lease to another, provided the lease contains no express
restrictions on alienation.40 Provided that alienation is permitted and the lease
contains a standard habendum clause, the lessee enjoys the ability to transfer its
interest during the primary term and throughout the secondary term, as long as
production is taking place.
B. Farmout Contracts
A farmout contract is one such transfer of interest. Formally defined, it “is an
agreement by one who owns drilling rights to assign all or a portion of those
rights to [a third party] in return for drilling or testing” and other consideration,
such as money or royalties.41 The owner of the drilling rights (“the farmor”) is
most often a lessee of an oil and gas lease, while the third party (known as the
“farmee”) is an operator ready to drill.42 The farmee “earns” the right to extract
oil from its assigned portion of the farmor’s lease upon the happening of a
specified event in the farmout contract (e.g., beginning production).43 This
means that upon the occurrence of the specified event, the farmee is assigned the
specified portion of the farmor’s lease, earning it the right to extract oil and gas
subject to the bargained-for lump sum payment or royalties. 44
1. Reasons for Farmout Agreements
There are various practical reasons for why lessees/farmors enter into farmout
contracts. They include: “(a) lease preservation, (b) lease salvage, (c) risk
sharing, (d) exploration and evaluation, (e) access to market, (f) obtaining
reserves, and (g) drilling an ‘obligation well.’”45 To illustrate, a lessee under a
typical oil and gas lease may be at the end of its primary term and may be
concerned about its ability to produce during the lease’s secondary term.46 Such
a lessee could alleviate its concerns by entering into a farmout contract with an
operator that is ready to drill. Upon executing the farmout contract, the
operator’s production would preserve the lease for the farmor once it enters its
secondary term because production would be maintained by the farmee.
Additionally, if the farmor’s lease contains drilling obligations, such as quantity
requirements, a farmout contract would be equally useful to help the farmor meet
these obligations. The farmee’s reasons for entering into a farmout contract
“mirror the motivations of the farmor”; they consist of the following:
39. Id. at 981–82.
40. Guy & Wright, supra note 34, at 480–81.
41. Lowe, supra note 25, at 268.
42. Id. at 268.
43. Id. at 269.
44. Id. at 269.
45. Id. at 287.
46. For example, the lessee may lack the capital required to drill once the oil and gas lease
enters into its secondary term.
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(1) the farmout is the quickest or cheapest way to obtain or expand an acreage
position or to obtain reserves; (2) the farmee may have cash, or equipment and
personnel that it wishes to keep busy; (3) the farmee may highly evaluate a
property that the farmor has dismissed as a poor prospect; or (4) the farmee may
want to become active in an area, but [may] be unwilling or unable to take the
risks alone.47
In brief, farmout agreements are an attractive supplement to the oil and gas
lease. Farmors benefit by having farmees preserve or expand their production
obligations, while farmees are rewarded with additional drilling opportunities.
2. Option verses Obligation Farmouts
Farmout contracts fall into two categories: option-based and obligationbased.48 The distinction between the two has an important implication on the
performance requirements of the parties, particularly at the beginning of the
farmout contract.49 In an option-based farmout, the farmee’s performance is a
condition; in an obligation farmout, its performance is a covenant.50 An optionbased farmout, similar to any garden-variety option contract, requires the farmee
to render performance in order to receive the assignment.51 If the farmee does
not perform, the assignment never takes place, and thus technically, the farmout
contract never forms.52 Conversely, under an obligation-based farmout, the
farmee makes “a legally binding promise” to perform.53 Thus, nonperformance
constitutes a breach and subjects the farmee to breach liability.54
III. THE TROUBLE WITH FARMOUTS: AN INNOCENT FARMEE’S
NONPERFORMANCE CANNOT BE READILY EXCUSED UNDER CURRENT LAW
The question remains how and when a farmee’s nonperformance under a
farmout contract can be excused. Under the traditional law of contracts, there
are two primary means for a party to excuse its nonperformance: First, a party
may argue that a force majeure clause in the contract excuses nonperformance.55
Second, a party may look beyond the contract and argue that nonperformance is
excused by virtue of one of the common law excuse doctrines.56 Additionally,
47. Id. at 291–92.
48. Id. at 304.
49. See id. at 305. Performance requirements at this stage differ in specifics, but generally
consist of the farmee being required to build a well and begin drilling within a specified amount of
time. See id. at 304 n.133, 305 n.136.
50. Id. at 304.
51. Id.
52. See generally id.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 305.
55. Robin L. Nolan & Adam F. Aldrich, Navigating Commercial Leases and Real Estate
Loans During Covid-19, 49 COLO. L. 36, 37 (2020).
56. Id. at 38.
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and specific to only oil and gas law, a lessee under an oil and gas lease may
argue that its nonperformance is excused by way of the temporary cessation of
production doctrine.57 Thus, on the surface, there is some law that is applicable
to the problem of the innocent, nonperforming farmee. However, these options
are either too difficult to trigger in practice or are legally incompatible with
farmout contracts.
A. Force Majeure Clauses
A force majeure clause is agreed to by the parties during bargaining; it sets
out certain circumstances that, if triggered, excuse nonperformance for one or
both of the parties.58 Typically, force majeure clauses excuse nonperformance
when “acts of God or other extraordinary events prevent a party from fulfilling
[its] contractual obligations.”59 These acts of God and extraordinary events need
to be “caused by circumstances beyond the reasonable control” of the
nonperforming party, or “is caused by an event which [was] unforeseeable at the
time the parties entered the contract.”60 Additionally, these circumstances
generally cannot be caused by the nonperforming party’s “fault or negligence.”61
In the context of the innocent, nonperforming farmee, the first obvious point
to make is that many farmout contracts simply do not contain force majeure
clauses.62 These clauses are not required and are only present if the parties
specifically agreed to them during bargaining.63
However, even if the parties did agree to one, triggering a force majeure clause
is often difficult.64 Courts will focus on the clause’s exact language to see if the
purported force majeure event actually falls within the clause’s intended
meaning.65 Broad catch-all phrases like “other events beyond the reasonable
57. Wilson, supra note 37, at 326.
58. Nolan & Aldrich, supra note 55, at 37, 39.
59. Id. at 37.
60. Joseph A. Schremmer, Crystal Gazing: Foretelling the Coming Decade in Oil and Gas
Law, 66 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 5–1, 5–67 to 5–68 (2020) (quoting Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v.
Tracker Expl., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 427, 435–36 (Tex. App. 1993)).
61. Gulf Oil Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 706 F.2d 444, 452 (3d Cir. 1983).
62. Jay D. Kelley, So What’s Your Excuse? An Analysis of Force Majeure Claims, 2 TEX. J.
OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 91, 92 (2007).
63. See generally Nolan & Aldrich, supra note 55, at 37.
64. See id.
65. 30 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:31 (4th ed.) (“A claim of ‘force majeure’ is
equivalent to an affirmative defense. What types of events constitute force majeure depend on the
specific language included in the clause itself. . . . A force majeure clause might read as follows:
‘The parties’ performance under this Agreement is subject to acts of God, war, government
regulation, terrorism, disaster, strikes (except those involving [a party’s] employees or agents), civil
disorder, curtailment of transportation facilities, or any other emergency beyond the parties’
control, making it inadvisable, illegal, or impossible to perform their obligations under this
Agreement. Either party may cancel this Agreement for any one or more of such reasons upon
written notice to the other.’”) (quoting OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 266 F. Supp.
2d 1214, 1220 (D. Haw. 2003)).
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control of the parties” (which are sometimes used) are interpreted narrowly,
thereby offering a nonperforming party a small window to argue on their basis.66
Course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade, in light of ejusdem
generis, have been employed by those invoking a force majeure clause to make
the connection between the clause’s wording and the alleged triggering event.67
Nonetheless, even with these tools of contractual interpretation, force majeure
clauses are diffcult to trigger because courts regularly demand that the purported
force majeure event be one within “precise terms” of the clause.68 For example,
in Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, the court found that a trade war
was not precise enough to fall within the force majeure clause’s broad language,
“acts of the Government.”69 Further, in TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co.,
a farmee attempted to argue that a significant decrease in the market value of oil
excused its nonperformance.70 The terms of the force majeure clause stated that
the farmee would be excused from nonperformance if it was caused by “reason
of fire, flood, storm, act of God, governmental authority, labor disputes, war or
any other cause not enumerated [] but which [was] beyond the [farmee’s]
reasonable control.”71 The court considered whether this catch-all provision
excused the farmee’s nonperformance and concluded that it did not.72 The
opinion explained that “fluctuations in the oil and gas market are foreseeable as
a matter of law, [and thus, such fluctuations] cannot be considered [as] a force
majeure event unless specifically listed as such in the contract.”73 Therefore,
even if a force majeure clause was present in the innocent, nonperforming
farmee’s farmout contract, it would be a considerable challenge for the farmee
to argue convincingly that its nonperformance is excused because of an
oversaturated oil market—unless such a circumstance was specifically agreed to
as an excuse for nonperformance during bargaining.
B. Impracticability and Frustration of Purpose Doctrines
At common law, “contractual covenants [are] considered absolute, subject to
no exceptions or excuses . . . even if some intervening circumstance ma[kes] [the
covenant] difficult or impossible to accomplish.”74 However, as the common
law developed, courts fashioned equitable exceptions to contractual
performance requirements if performance would result in undue harshness to
66. Schremmer, supra note 56, at 5-68 to 5-69.
67. Id.
68. Nolan & Aldrich, supra note 51, at 37.
69. Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC, 886 N.W.2d 445, 452–53 (2015).
70. TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 180 (Tex. App. 2018);
Schremmer, supra note 56, at 5–70.
71. TEC Olmos, LLC, 555 S.W.3d at 179 (emphasis added); Schremmer, supra note 56, at 571.
72. TEC Olmos, LLC, 555 S.W.3d at 186.
73. Id. at 184 (emphasis added); Schremmer, supra note 56, at 5-71.
74. Schremmer, supra note 60, at 5–61.
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one of the parties.75 The problem of the innocent, nonperforming farmee can be
framed in this light. Most relevant to this context are the doctrines of
impracticability and frustration of purpose.
For impracticability, the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS states that a party’s contractual
obligations may be discharged if, “after the contract is made, a party’s
performance is made impracticable without [the party’s] fault by the occurrence
of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made.”76 And for frustration of purpose, the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS provides that a party’s contractual obligations may be
discharged if, “after the contract is made, a party’s principal purpose is
substantially frustrated without [the party’s] fault by the occurrence of an event
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made.”77
The impracticability and frustration of purpose doctrines have a flexible, but
limited, application.78 The key factor in persuading a court to apply either is
showing that the event that caused the nonperformance was “unforeseeable” to
the parties at the time of contracting.79 To prove that an event was
unforeseeable, the innocent, nonperforming farmee would have to convincingly
assert one of the following arguments. For impracticability, the farmee would
have to show that an “unanticipated circumstance [] made performance of the
promise vitally different from what should reasonably have been within the
contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract.”80 For
frustration of purpose, the farmee would have to “show total, or near total,
destruction of the essential purpose of the transaction.”81
The farmee could raise either of these doctrines as its excuse for
nonperformance. However, the substantial obstacle to invoking either doctrine
successfully is that courts have consistently declined to apply these doctrines
simply because unfavorable changes in market conditions caused the
nonperformance.82 The courts’ reasoning is grounded in the principle that

75. See id.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
78. Transatl. Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“The doctrine
ultimately represents the ever-shifting line, drawn by courts hopefully responsive to commercial
practices and mores, at which the community’s interest in having contracts enforced according to
their terms is outweighed by the commercial senselessness of requiring performance.”).
79. Schremmer, supra note 60, at 5–62 (emphasis omitted).
80. City of Littleton v. Emps. Fire Ins. Co., 453 P.2d 810, 812 (1969) (emphasis added).
81. Beals v. Tri-B Assocs., 644 P.2d 78, 80–81 (Colo. App. 1982).
82. See, e.g., id. at 81 (holding that “[t]he risk that economic conditions may change, or that
government actions of the type involved here may impair the profitability of a real estate
development, are not so unforeseeable that they are outside the risks assumed under the contract”);
Hemlock Semiconductor Operations, LLC v. SolarWorld Indus. Sachsen GmbH, 867 F.3d 692,
702 (6th Cir. 2017) (“The expectation that current market conditions will continue for the life of
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changes in market conditions are a basic assumption of every contract.83 Thus,
if the farmee were to argue that the oversaturated oil market excuses its
nonperformance, its argument falls—at least somewhat—into that category.
Additionally, the farmee would be faced with the fact that the nature of its
performance and the overall purpose of the farmout contract remain the same,
regardless of the state of the oil market.
C. Temporary Cessation of Production Doctrine
Similar to why courts developed the impracticability and frustration of
purpose doctrines, the temporary cessation of production doctrine was fashioned
to prevent the harsh termination of oil and gas leases.84 Recall that the habendum
clause within the typical oil and gas lease is worded something to this effect:
“from A to B for ten years, and as long thereafter as oil is being produced.” The
lease has two terms within its lifecycle, a “primary term” (“from A to B for ten
years”) and a “secondary term” (“and as long thereafter as oil is being
produced”).85 Under traditional law of contracts, the habendum clause’s plain
language indicates that if a lessee ceases to produce for any reason while the
lease is in its secondary term, it will automatically terminate the whole lease
“without regard to the reasonableness of the []lessee’s actions.”86 Courts
recognized the practical severity of this approach and gradually “soften[ed] the
callousness of the automatic termination rule” by creating the temporary
cessation of production doctrine.87 The doctrine was first introduced by name
in Watson v. Rochmill.88 There, the court held that the automatic termination
rule could be “modified where there is [] a temporary cessation of production
due to [a] sudden stoppage of the well or some mechanical breakdown of the
equipment . . . or the like.”89 The opinion reasoned that “[u]nder such
circumstances . . . the lessee is entitled to a reasonable time in which to remedy
the defect and resume production.”90 Courts gradually extended the doctrine’s
the contract is not such a basic assumption, so shifts in market prices ordinarily do not constitute
impracticability.”); TEC Olmos, LLC, 555 S.W.3d at 184.
83. Nolan & Aldrich, supra note 55, at 38; TEC Olmos, LLC , 555 S.W.3d at 184.
84. Wilson, supra note 37, at 326 (“[T]he rules of property law, as applied to oil and gas
leases, cause a lease to terminate automatically upon cessation of production. To reiterate, this
merciless consequence has historically resulted no matter what the cause of the cessation. When
the leasehold language does not specify otherwise, any cessation, ‘be it mechanical failure, force
majeure, governmental regulation, loss of market or economic advantage, would terminate the
lease.’ With this harsh consequence in mind, the courts turned to the [temporary cessation of
production] doctrine.”).
85. Ritchie, supra note 11, at 985.
86. Wilson, supra note 37, at 318, 324.
87. Wilson, supra note 37, at 326; see, e.g., Scarborough v. New Domain Oil & Gas Co., 276
S.W. 331, 336 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
88. Wilson, supra note 37, at 328.
89. Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1941).
90. Id.
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protections beyond the limited circumstances outlined in Rochmill.91 In its
modern form, the doctrine temporarily excuses nonperformance during the
lease’s secondary term, if it was caused by “mechanical failure, lack of a market,
a fire, or [a] reworking [of drilling] operations” and gives the lessee a
“reasonable [amount of] time to recommence production.” 92 To invoke it,
courts generally require the lessee to satisfy a two-prong test.93 The doctrine
differs greatly from impracticability and frustration of purpose in that it does not
require that the event that caused the nonperformance to be one that was
“unforeseeable” to the parties at the time of contracting.94 Given this lower
burden, some courts have specifically held that the doctrine may be triggered to
excuse nonperformance as a result of a “total lack of a market” for oil and gas.95
For example, in Hoff v. Girdler Corp., the Colorado Supreme Court held that
a lack of market for helium gas was a valid excuse for nonperformance, and as
such, did not terminate an oil and gas lease in its secondary term.96 The common
thread within the court’s reasoning was fairness. The opinion explained that
lessee’s cessation of production was involuntary, because the market for gas that
it was producing “vanished.”97 The court focused on the lessee’s ultimate intent
to preserve the lease and reasoned that the production stoppage did not
disadvantage either the lessor or lessee and thus did not warrant a termination of
the lease.98 In Stimson v. Tarrant, the Ninth Circuit held that a lessee’s
nonperformance does not terminate an oil and gas lease in its secondary term, if
‘“no profitable market [was] within [the] reach”‘ of the lessee when production
ceased.99 Like in Hoff, this conclusion was grounded in fairness. The court cited
the lower court’s finding that “the lessee exercised reasonable diligence in
attempting to find a[n] [alternative] market.”100 The court ultimately found that
the lessee’s intention was not to abandon the lease and noted that stopping

91. Wilson, supra note 37, at 336.
92. Ritchie, supra note 11, at 985–86.
93. Ritchie, supra note 11, at 985–86; Wilson, supra note 37, at 315 (“The first prong is a
determination of whether a legal excuse for the cessation existed. Courts look specifically at the
cause of the cessation to make their determination. Under the second prong, the court determines
whether, under the circumstances, the lessee exercised diligence in successfully remedying the
defect and resuming production within a reasonable amount of time. In other words, the second
prong concerns the reasonableness of the time and effort the lessee exhausted in resuming
production and determines whether the cessation was truly temporary. Both prongs of this test have
given courts much difficulty in application.”).
94. Schremmer, supra note 60, at 5–66.
95. Id.
96. Hoff v. Girdler Corp., 88 P.2d 100, 101–03 (1939).
97. Id. at 103.
98. Id.
99. Stimson v. Tarrant, 132 F.2d 363, 364–65 (9th Cir. 1942) (quoting Steven v. Potlatch Oil
& Refining Co., 80 Mont. 239, 254 (1927)).
100. Id. at 363.
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production was “obviously more economical[ly]” prudent than continuing at a
loss.101
The driving principle behind the temporary cessation of production doctrine
is fairness. Functionally, the doctrine is an equitable decision by a court to mute
a lessee’s technical breach of the oil and gas lease in its secondary term to
prevent its harsh termination—a termination that would otherwise result under
the traditional law of contracts.102 The equitable principle behind the temporary
cessation of production doctrine and the fact patterns that it has been applied to
seem analogous to the problem of the innocent, nonperforming farmee. After
all, the heart of the farmee’s problem—a lack of market for oil—forces it to
make a choice that is fundamentally unfair.103
However, the doctrine’s mechanics are incompatible with farmout contracts.
A farmout contract contains no primary or secondary term. Whether it is
obligation or option based, a farmout contract is simply a promise that the farmee
makes to produce within a specified period of time and thereafter.104 Thus,
unsurprisingly, there are no reported cases where courts have extended the
doctrine’s protections to farmout contracts. Moreover, in direct contrast with
cases such as Hoff and Stimson, one jurisdiction has declined even to apply the
doctrine to situations where a lack of market caused the lessee’s
nonperformance, reasoning that “lessee[s] could have provided for such a
contingency” during drafting.105
IV. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF THE INNOCENT, NONPERFORMING FARMEE
The current law offers a limited array of options to address the problem of the
innocent, nonperforming farmee. The solution proposed by this comment is that
courts should modify the temporary cessation of production doctrine by
extending its protection of nonperformance to farmout contracts, or
alternatively, by liberally applying the doctrines of impracticability and
frustration of purpose to accomplish the same result. Adopting either of these
approaches would be a departure from the current law. However, from its
inception, oil and gas law has been an unorthodox project.106 The unique nature

101. Id. at 365.
102. See Wilson, supra note 37, at 326, 328; Scarborough, 276 S.W. at 336.
103. See supra Part I, p. 6 (“Little Pump is in a precarious position through no fault of its own,
one that goes beyond simple inconvenience or even the regular hazards of the oil industry. On a
microlevel, it forces Little Pump to decide between two difficult, and seemingly unfair, choices:
the company can elect to perform as planned but then be stuck with oil for which there is no
meaningful demand, requiring it to either to sell the oil at an undesirable rate (assuming it could
find a buyer), or shoulder the significant cost of storing it. Alternatively, Little Pump can refuse to
perform as expected but, by not doing so, loose the entire farmout.”).
104. See supra Part II, Section B; Lowe, supra note 25, at 269.
105. Schremmer, supra note 60, at 5–66; see, e.g., Elliott v. Crystal Springs Oil Co., 187 P.
692, 694 (Kan. 1920); Collins v. Mt. Pleasant Oil & Gas Co., 118 P. 54, 56 (Kan. 1911).
106. See generally Coleman, supra note 29.
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of oil and gas has forced the judiciary to treat the transactions surrounding them
in unconventional ways.107 A survey of the relevant precedent suggests that
courts have deviated from applying established legal principles to issues unique
to oil and gas transactions when doing so would compromise either fairness or
public policy.108 Fairness, which is most often cited to by courts when deviating,
can be defined as the absence of oppression or unfair surprise to the performing
party.109 Public policy, in this context, centers around the broader impact that
the production of oil and gas has on the economy and national defense, as well
as the public’s interest in preventing the waste of oil, a nonrenewable
resource.110
A. Courts Historically Have Deviated From Applying Established Legal
Principals in Oil and Gas Law to Promote Fairness and Favorable Public
Policy
The problem of the innocent, nonperforming farmee defies fairness in two
ways. First, if a farmee under an option-based farmout, like Little Pump, decides
to drill, it will be forced into an undesirable business position. The farmee would
either have to suffer the significant cost of storage, or presuming it can find a
buyer, sell the oil at a price that reflects the oversaturated market.111 Second, if
the farmee refuses to drill, it will lose the entire expected assignment from the
farmout. A farmee under an obligation-based farmout would likewise be placed
in similar difficulty as one under an option-based farmout. Drilling would leave
the farmee with oil that is not in demand and refusing to drill would thrust the
farmor and the farmee into unnecessary litigation surrounding the breach of the
farmee’s obligation.112 Either circumstance is oppressive and an unfair surprise
to the farmee. The problem also defies public policy. On one hand, forcing the
farmee to drill and add oil into an already oversaturated market compromises the
economy and national security.113 On the other, compelling production of a
finite resource for no other reason than to abide by the contract is a quintessential

107. See infra Part IV, Section A.
108. Id.
109. David E. Pierce, Exploring the Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the Implied Covenant to
Market, 48 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 10–11, 10–16 (2002); see infra Part IV, Section A.
110. See Desjardin, supra note 15.
111. See supra Part I, at 6; Tenreiro, supra note 30.
112. See Part II, Section B, Subsection 2; by not performing pursuant to the farmout contract’s
obligation, the farmee would be in breach. The farmor in this circumstance would have a breach
of contract claim against the farmee. If the farmor decided to pursue it, absent a valid excuse, the
farmee would be subject to breach liability that could consist of money damages or, worse yet, lead
to the termination of the whole contract, if the breach is found to be material.
113. See generally US Oil Needs More Explicit Support from Policymakers: Standard
Chartered, CNBC (Apr. 24, 2020, 1:24 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2020/04/24/us-oilneeds-more-explicit-support-from-policymakers-standard-chartered.html; Charles L. Glaser, How
Oil Influences U.S. National Security, 38 INT’L. SECS. J. 112, 112–13 (2013).
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illustration of waste.114 The following subsections discuss examples of when
courts have deviated from applying established legal principles to oil and gas
transactions when doing so would defy fairness or public policy.
1. The Rule Against Perpetuities
The famous (to many, the infamous) Rule Against Perpetuities “precludes the
creation of any future interest in property which does not necessarily vest within
twenty-one years after a life or lives presently in being, plus the period of
gestation, where gestation is, in fact, taking place.”115 The Rule’s reputation in
mercilessly invaliding property interests is well-known within the legal
community from the time of every lawyer’s first-year property class.116 Yet, a
lesser known wrinkle is how the Rule clashes with the conveyance of mineral
interests. Jason Oil Co., LLC v. Littler, a recent Kansas case, illustrates this
“common” problem in the oil and gas industry.117
In Littler, the Kansas Supreme Court considered the following situation: a fee
simple owner conveyed a tract of land to his son, but reserved the mineral
interest in the tract “for a period of 20 years or as long thereafter as oil and/or
gas . . . [are being] produced.”118 Under the literal wording of the conveyance,
the son was granted a fee simple in the surface estate and a springing executory
interest in its mineral estate.119 The executory interest would spring to the son
only if oil and gas were no longer produced from the property. A strict
application of the Rule to this conveyance would quickly render the entire
conveyance invalid, because the executory interest was not guaranteed to vest
within twenty-one years of the death of the lives in being—as oil and gas could
be produced from the land for well more than that timeframe.120 However,
despite the license to do so under the black letter of the common law, the court
declined to apply the Rule and held the conveyance to be valid.121 The court
reasoned that applying the Rule would defy public policy by harming the oil and
gas industry,122 and noted that such a strict application went against the
114. See generally John A. Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a Landscape of Waste, 72 MO. L. R.
1209, 1212 (2007).
115. Jason Oil Co., LLC v. Littler, 446 P.3d 1058, 1062 (2019).
116. Bruce M. Kramer, Modern Applications of the Rule Against Perpetuities to Oil and Gas
Transactions: What the Duke of Norfolk Didn’t Tell You, 37 NAT. RES. J. 281, 281 (1997).
117. Littler, 446 P.3d at 1067 (“The Grantees’ heirs and the Amici Curiae additionally argue
that these transactions are common in the oil and gas industry and application of the Rule will
impact many other property owners who received their interest from similarly worded deeds. We
recognize that the undisputed facts relied upon by the district court did not address this contention.
But . . . Kansas caselaw provides multiple examples of these transactions, and we cannot ignore
that reality.”).
118. Id. at 1060.
119. Id. at 1065.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1068.
122. Id. at 1065.
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fundamental purpose of the Rule. Under this rationale, other courts have
“simply assumed the validity of these interests without any discussion of the rule
against perpetuities.”123
2. Implied Covenants
Courts sometimes will imply covenants to typical contracts under certain
circumstances;124 “[i]n oil and gas leases, however, implied obligations are more
commonly enforced . . . [and] play a much larger role than they do in contracts
generally.”125 For example, even though the language that sets out the primary
term in the typical oil and gas lease coveys the interest for a fixed period, courts
will generally “not allow the lessee to remain . . . idle during” that time.126
Instead, the lessee is held to an implied obligation that, at the very least, test
drilling or exploration must be done during the primary term.127
There are two theories behind the usage of implied covenants in oil and gas
leases. Some courts reason that implied covenants are implied-in-fact.128 They
serve as gap-fillers that collectively direct “lessee[s] to perform [] activities [that
are] unexpressed in [the] lease,” but are nevertheless consistent with its overall
purpose.129 Under this approach, a court will impose an implied covenant when
it is evident from “the common intent of the parties.”130 Other courts posit that
implied covenants are implied-in-law, meaning that they will be imposed to
ensure an equitable execution of the lease, regardless of whether the implied
covenant aligns with the parties’ overall purpose in making it.131

123. See, e.g., Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620, 630 (Wyo. 1983) (“An executory interest, by
definition, does not vest so long as it remains a future interest. Consequently, all executory interests
are subject to invalidation by the rule against perpetuities. To say that a rule-against-perpetuities
result is contrary to the intentions of the parties is of no avail, because the rule against perpetuities
always operates to frustrate the parties’ intentions. Despite the foregoing conclusion that the
exception by the grantor of a determinable fee may subject the granted executory interest to
problems with the rule against perpetuities, only a few courts have found such interests to be
void.”); Rousselot v. Spanier, 60 Cal. App. 3d 238, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Traywick v. Transcon.
Gas Pipe Line Corp., 170 So. 2d 802, 805 (Ala. 1965).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see, e.g., Wood
v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
125. Keith B. Hall, Implied Covenants and the Drafting of Oil and Gas Leases, 7 LSU J.
ENERGY L. & RES. 401, 403 (2019).
126. Ritchie, supra note 11, at 982.
127. Id.
128. Hall, supra note 125, at 406.
129. Alexander Nicolai von Kreisler, Note, Imposing Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas
Leases-Covenant of Further Exploration Tenuously Supported Under Texas Jurisprudence: Sun
Exploration and Production Co. v. Jackson, 715 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.,—
Houston [1ST DIST.] 1986, WRIT GRANTED), 19 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1231, 1234 (1988); see, e.g.,
Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 73 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Cal. 1937).
130. Hall, supra note 125, at 406.
131. Hall, supra note 125, at 406; see, e.g., Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 772 A.2d 445
(2001).
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Irrespective of the implied-in-fact and implied-in-law distinction, which is
largely academic and beyond the scope of this comment, the use and frequency
of implied covenants evidences the unique flexibility that the judiciary affords
to oil and gas transactions.132 Courts are comfortable imposing these unbargained-for obligations because the inherent “complexities and uncertainties”
of oil and gas production prevent the parties from fully addressing every aspect
of the lease during bargaining.133 These inherent complexities and uncertainties
makes producers within the industry particularly suspectable to oppression and
unfair surprise, which in turn, prompts courts to impose measures, like implied
covenants, to prevent parties from falling victim to either.
3. Privity
A lessee may sublease to a third-party, barring any express terms in the lease
that state otherwise.134 Subleasing raises the issue of whether the original lessor
can sue the sublessee if it breaches the original lease. At common law, for the
original lessor to sue a sublessee, it must show that it is in vertical privity with
the sublessee.135 Vertical privity is the requirement that there be a “legal
connection” between the two parties.136 The consensus among courts is that
vertical privity exists only when the lessee assigned its entire leased interest to
the sublessee—it cannot retain a reversion interest or even, in some jurisdictions,
the power of termination.137
Yet, it is frequent practice in the oil and gas industry for lessees to sublease to
third parties while maintaining a reversion interest or an overriding royalty
interest.138 Thus, at common law, if a sublessee is subject to an overriding
royalty and also breaches a covenant of the original lease, the lessor has no
ability to pursue action directly against it.139
The California Supreme Court, in Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co.,
recognized this predicament and reasoned that an exception to the common law

132. See generally Hall, supra note 125.
133. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 125, at 405 (quoting A.W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of Property
Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 11 TEX. L. REV. 399, 399 (1933)) (“It is
doubtful if any other character of legal instrument can be found in which one of the parties has so
much potentially at stake with so little express contractual protection.”).
134. See generally Blake A. Watson, Do I Have to Be Reasonable?: The Right to Arbitrarily
Restrict Transfer of Occupancy and Mineral Leases, 47 CAP. U. L. REV. 27 (2019).
135. Bruce M. Kramer, Property and Oil and Gas Don’t Mix: The Mangling of Common Law
Property Concepts, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 540, 562 (1994) (The original lessor and lessee must
“intend the covenant to be binding on [the third party], the promise must touch and concern the
estate . . . [and] there must be horizontal privity between the [lessor] and [lessee]”).
136. See generally Douglas J. Whaley et al., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON THE SALE AND
LEASE OF GOODS 215 (8th ed.) (2019).
137. Kramer, supra note 135, at 556.
138. Kramer, supra note 135, at 562–63.
139. Kramer, supra note 135, at 563.
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in such situations is warranted.140 Ranch Co. involved an oil and gas lease that
was subleased by the lessee.141 The lessee retained an overriding royalty interest
in the oil that was produced by the sublessee.142 After the execution of the
sublease, the lessor demanded that the sublessee pay it the royalties pursuant to
the original lease terms.143 The sublessee refused and argued that, under the
common law rule, the lessor could not bring suit against it to enforce the terms
of the original lease.144 While the court permitted the action on other grounds,
it explained in dictum, that the sublessee could not make such an argument
because of the fairness concerns that it posed.145 The court reasoned that the
“the lessor has a definite property right” in the oil that is produced from the lease,
even if a sublessee produces it.146 It concluded that this right cannot be defeated
simply because the lessee subleased while retaining an overriding royalty.147
This exception, though technical in nature, again illustrates the willingness of
courts to deviate from established legal principles in oil and gas transactions to
ensure fairness.
B. Broadening the Temporary Cessation of Production Doctrine
As previously discussed, the temporary cessation of production doctrine
applies to only oil and gas leases.148 However, at its core, courts created the
doctrine in the spirit of fairness, to alleviate lessees from an “inadvertent and
inappropriate termination” of their oil and gas lease.149 Significantly, the
doctrine has been successfully employed to excuse the temporary
nonperformance of lessees’ caused by a “lack of a market.”150 The innocent,
nonperforming farmee is faced with an almost identical problem, one that the
temporary cessation of production doctrine seemingly was created to relieve in
oil and gas leases.
Drawing back to the hypothetical, Little Pump, the innocent, nonperforming
farmee, is under an option-based farmout contract that requires it to drill on
Blackacre within a three-year period.151 Should it fail to do so—no matter the
cause or any reasonable steps that the farmee might have taken to perform—it
loses its entire potential assignment from the farmor. The farmee would not
140. Kramer, supra note 135, at 563; Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 73 P.2d 1163, 1168,
1171 (Cal. 1937).
141. Ranch Co., 73 P.2d at 1165.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1171.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See supra Part III, Section C.
149. Wilson, supra note 37, at 344.
150. Ritchie, supra note 11, at 985–86.
151. See supra Part I.

Fall 2022]

The Trouble With Farmouts

843

suffer this loss because of its own doing; rather, it would suffer the loss because
of something completely beyond its control—a lack of market for oil. A
similarly harsh result would occur if the farmee was under an obligation-based
farmout contract. In such a case, the farmee would likely be thrust into
unnecessary litigation with the farmor, which would likely force it to pay
damages or, worse yet, terminate its assignment if the breach was found to be
material. Moreover, should the farmee (whether under an option-based or
obligation-based farmout) decide to perform, not only would it be forced to
suffer the costs associated with producing unwanted oil, it would also be
infusing oil into an already oversaturated market. This would contribute to the
greater oversaturation problem, which compromises the economy and national
security and promotes the waste of a nonrenewable resource.
The problem of the innocent, nonperforming farmee would be resolved by
extending the temporary cessation of production doctrine to farmout contracts.
Under this approach, nonperforming farmees whose nonperformance was
caused by “a lack of a market” for oil would be temporarily excused from
performance.152 Such a modification of the doctrine would further its purpose
of preventing “inadvertent and inappropriate termination[s]”; moreover, it
would be in line with the judiciary’s tradition of ensuring fairness and promoting
good public policy in oil and gas transactions.153
C. Liberally Applying the Doctrine of Impracticability and Frustration of
Purpose
In order to convince a court to excuse nonperformance under the common law
excuse doctrines of impracticability and frustration of purpose, a nonperforming
farmee would have to establish either impracticability or frustration of purpose.
For impracticability, it would have to show that an “unanticipated circumstance
[] made performance of the promise vitally different from what should
reasonably have been within the contemplation of both parties when they entered
into the contract.”154 For frustration of purpose, it would have to “show [a] total,
or near total, destruction of the essential purpose of the transaction.”155 There is
a significant amount of case law that maintains that these doctrines cannot be
used to excuse nonperformance caused by unfavorable economic conditions,
which presumably includes the farmee’s fundamental problem—the lack of a
market for oil.156 Nevertheless, carving out an exception to the established law
152. Ritchie, supra note 11, at 985–86.
153. Wilson, supra note 37, at 344.
154. City of Littleton, 453 P.2d 78 at 812 (emphasis added).
155. Beals, 644 P.2d at 81.
156. See, e.g., Hemlock Semiconductor Operations, LLC, F.3d 692 at 703 (6th Cir. 2017)
(“[T]he simple fact that a contract has become unprofitable for one of the parties is generally
insufficient to establish impracticability.”); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp.
53, 74 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (quoting Uniform. Commercial Code § 2-615, cmt. 4) (“Increased cost
alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency
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in this area would be consistent with the unique manner in which courts have
treated oil and gas transactions.157 The judiciary’s willingness to deviate from
established law to ensure fairness and promote good public policy is explained
in detail in the previous sections of this comment.158
From the fairness perspective, applying the excuse doctrines would protect
the farmee from having to drill oil that is expensive to store and not in demand
given the oversaturated market. From a public policy perspective, applying
these doctrines would prevent oil from flooding an already oversaturated market
that puts the American economy and national security at risk. Moreover, as
many cases filed in 2020 make their way through court systems, some
jurisdictions have indicated that these doctrines can temporarily excuse
nonperformance that was caused by circumstances related to the COVID-19
Pandemic.159 However, this is still a minority attitude—even to nonperformance
related to the Pandemic.160 Thus, to address the problem of the innocent,
nonperforming farmee, modifying the temporary cessation of production
remains the better alternative.
V. CONCLUSION
Applying the current law to the problem of the innocent, nonperforming
farmee compromises both fairness and public policy. It leaves farmees with the
harsh reality that should they not be able to perform their duties under farmout
contracts—regardless of their blamelessness—they could face monetary
damages, or worse, a loss of their farmout assignments. Moreover, it encourages
which alters the essential nature of the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in
itself a justification, for that is exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at
fixed prices are intended to cover.”); Island Dev. Corp. v. D.C., 933 A.2d 340, 352 (D.C. 2007)
(noting that “a party demonstrates that an event ‘substantially frustrated’ the purpose of a contract
by showing that ‘changed conditions have rendered the performance bargained from the promisee
worthless, not because the promissor’s performance has become different or impracticable’”)
(quoting Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 308 F.3d 1283, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also
supra Part III, Section C.
157. See supra Part III, Section A.
158. Id.
159. Bay City Realty, LLC v. Mattress Firm, Inc., No. 20-CV-11498, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67054, at *30 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 7, 2021) (holding that the doctrines of impracticability and
frustration of purpose temporarily excused a lessee’s nonpayment under a commercial lease
because of the effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic); Umnv 205-207 Newbury, LLC v. Caffé Nero
Ams., Inc., Nos. 145768, 2084CV01493-BLS2, 2021 Mass. Super. LEXIS 12, at *19 (Feb. 8, 2021)
(holding that “Defendant’s obligation to pay rent under the parties’ Lease was discharged under the
doctrine of frustration of purpose from March 24 to June 22, 2020, and during any other period
when Defendant was barred by government order concerning the COVID-19 pandemic not to allow
any consumption of food or beverage within the lease premises.”).
160. See Wroblesky v. Hughley, 169 N.E.3d 709 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2021) (holding that
the doctrines of impracticability and frustration of purpose did not excuse a lessee’s
nonperformance even if it was caused by the effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic); CAI Rail, Inc.
v. Badger Mining Corp., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32564, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021); In re CEC
Ent., Inc., 625 B.R. 344, 364 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020).
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farmees to drill at all costs, regardless of the negative impact that production has
on the economy, national security, and the public’s interest in preventing waste.
The recent turmoil in oil markets highlights these vulnerabilities and
demonstrates to courts that, when such matters ripen into litigation, a solution
will be needed. This solution, modifying the temporary cessation of production
doctrine or liberally applying the doctrines of impracticability and frustration of
purpose, is attainable and is supported by the historical willingness of courts to
deviate from established law to ensure fairness and promote favorable public
policy. After all, oil and gas law is built on such deviations.
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